When the political arena no longer becomes about compromise, it becomes a matter of dominating by one group over the other.

In some situations, such as in the case a major economic collapse or a significant military defeat, voters may seek extreme options by choosing political parties which promise to single-handedly save the country from its economic or political woes, usually through authoritarian means.

The often unforeseen cost of electing these parties, however, is that they tend to destroy democratic principles once they enter power. In , after the end of World War I, Germany was defeated, its monarchy ousted, and a republican democracy was formed in its place. The young Weimar Republic had a highly innovative constitution that, for the first time in German history, granted all Germans broad representation and the universal right to vote.

The Entente powers imposed the harsh and deeply humiliating Treaty of Versailles that forced Germany to pay massive indemnities to the Entente powers, which left the country impoverished. The defeat also significantly destabilized German society and politics, leading to a series of revolutions and attempted coups Putsches throughout the s as various different radical groups ranging from communists to militarists sought to take over the Weimar government.

Amidst the disorder, a fringe group slowly rose to prominence: they were the National Socialists, or Nazis. They first emerged on the German political scene in when they attempted the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich, a plot where they sought to take over the Weimar government by force. After six years of recovery and even some economic prosperity for Germany, the Great Depression of once again threw Weimar Germany in a desperate economic state, prompting many German voters to seek radical political options, including National Socialism.

In , the Nazis were elected to become the leading party of the German parliament, campaigning on the promise to restore German greatness by taking revenge on Britain and France for the Treaty of Versailles. The next year, an arsonist attempted to burn the German parliament building the Reichstag , which Hitler and his Nazi Party used as a pretext to seize full dictatorial control of Germany. Over the next twelve years, they entirely dismantled the democratic political establishment; instituted the worst genocide in human history, the Holocaust; and started the bloodiest war humankind has ever experienced, World War II.

As a result, they may seek non-democratic alternatives that will protect their wealth, status, or political influence from being taken away by rival elites, or even average voters. These non-democratic alternatives may then take power through a variety of methods. One means is to use democracy against itself. In this situation, a specific party wins an election and then uses its position as the leader of the government to curtail democratic rights, such as cancelling future elections.

At other times, a democracy may collapse in a significantly more violent fashion, such as through a coup or revolution. In the case of a revolution, a significant portion of the population mobilizes itself against the current reigning government and then overthrows that government, promptly instating an alternative government which is not necessarily democratic in nature.

What is more often the case, however, is that democracy can be ended through a hostile coup against the democratically-elected government, where a relatively small but powerful political faction such as the military or an intelligence service overthrows the elected officials. The newly established post-coup regime, usually claiming the excuse of a national emergency, then curtails democratic rights, governing instead through dictatorial means.

Moscow continues to deploy non-conventional tools such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns throughout Europe and in the United States. But Beijing in the future may seek to export an authoritarian model, which is increasingly backed by technologies for digital censorship and monitoring.

Advancements in artificial intelligence will only make the challenges more formidable in the years ahead. At a time when global democracy is challenged, the majority of those living under democratic governance live outside the West. Protecting the democratic character of the international order will therefore require new coalitions of democratic states beyond the traditional trans-Atlantic core. To preserve the prospects for democracy in a changing international order will require serious effort along four lines:.

While the question of democracy in the Middle East and West Asia remains fraught with ever-changing instability and complexity, critical areas of focus include support for basic democratic institutions such as civil-military relations, parliamentary procedures, and free media in stable countries.

The trajectory of democracy and the state of the international order are two issue areas often debated separately, but they are intimately linked. If in the coming phase of contested international order, leading and emerging democratic states renew their political institutions and social contracts and forge a wide coalition for action, then we could see a period when strategic competition with China and a firm pushback against Russia will be blended with economic growth and focused cooperation.

If not, we will enter a period characterized both by democratic retrenchment and a more turbulent, even violent clash between models. A new Cold War is not the worst potential scenario ahead of us, nor should it be the ceiling of our ambition. Executive Summary. Related Books.

Order from Chaos The new geopolitics Bruce Jones. Political and social polarization has also risen in many democracies, driven by and enabling anti-democratic populists. Here too, the democracy support community is behind the curve, without a well-developed set of operational principles and approaches for addressing rising polarization where it is occurring.

The coronavirus pandemic has put further pressure on the overburdened field of democracy support. Many authoritarian or authoritarian-leaning governments have used the public health emergency as an excuse to enact new constraints on political and civic freedoms, causing a spike in the already worrisome global authoritarian trend. Caught up with the struggle to address the pandemic at home, some established democracies have less time and attention for democracy abroad.

Others have been caught so flat-footed in their response that this has lessened the attractiveness of the system of democracy itself.

Unable to set aside its polarization even to protect its citizens from death, the United States has particularly weakened its power of attraction. Meanwhile, many of the usual forms of democracy assistance and pro-democracy diplomacy are blocked by travel restrictions and domestic lockdowns.

The unfolding global economic crisis has also constricted domestic and international resources for democracy support. Some foreign-aid funds have been shifted to near-term medical and poverty-related relief. Just when these multiple challenges have been coming to a head, underlining the need for renewed engagement and innovation in international democracy support, U. As has been extensively chronicled, Trump abandoned this position.

His administration embraced dictators rather than democratic allies; repeatedly failed to mount high-level pro-democracy diplomacy at critical junctures, including in strategically salient states such as Belarus and Ethiopia; engaged ineffectively or not at all in vital multilateral forums and alliances with democratic import, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO to the Open Government Partnership; and propagated antidemocratic ideas and practices at home, from undermining the rule of law to attacking independent media.

As vice president and a senator, Biden has a long history of valuing democratic allies and alliances as well as of understanding the worth of a more democratic world. During the election campaign, he made clear his intention to return the United States to the table of international democracy support; and his administration is already moving forward in that regard.

To start with, institutional renovation is not an overnight process. Trying to repair its status will absorb a significant share of energy and political capital that might otherwise be available to help support democracy abroad.

Even though the United States is rededicating itself to the democracy field with the start of the Biden administration, the daunting international context requires a wider renovation of international democracy support.

Crucial in this mix will be middle-power democracies because of their number, heft, and experience. While the EU is a sui generis political entity, its role as an aggregator and mobilizer of various middle-power democracies—as well as its sizable diplomatic and assistance efforts in the democracy domain—places it in this category as well.

Since the early s, middle-power democracies have constituted a significant and often crucial part of international democracy support. They have engaged in extensive efforts to foster free and fair elections, strengthen political parties, nurture civil society development, back the rule of law, and develop independent media, among many other productive endeavors in new democracies all around the world.

Their collective democracy-related assistance has outweighed that of the United States, and their diplomatic engagement on democracy issues has been extensive and often consequential.

Their democracy support is less frequently attacked than that of the United States as instrumental cover for geopolitical goals although the question nevertheless arises, especially with regard to former colonial powers like France and the United Kingdom. Middle-power democracies are located in multiple regions, have cooperative diplomatic relations with many countries, and maintain an active presence in many relevant multilateral organizations. Their leverage, in other words, is great.

Ten years ago there were hopes that some newer democracies, such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and Turkey, would join this set of countries as they began to assert themselves in various ways to support democracy in their regions and more widely. Nevertheless, non-Western democracies are crucial to the future of international democracy support because of their power within their regions and their visibility as models of democratic success or failure in the non-Western world.

Even as they have suffered democratic erosion, these non-Western middle powers still often engage at least to some extent in supporting democracy beyond their borders, whether through diplomacy or aid programs. Countries that are slipping out of the democratic sphere cannot be considered middle-power democracies in the same way as the set of countries listed previously.

Yet they can also play a valuable role. Where governments, or parts of governments, are turning away from democratic values, other important elements in these states, whether parliaments, parties, the media, or civil society organizations, should be welcomed in adding their voice and assistance to the democracy agenda. Middle-power democracies have many differences in their international engagement due to their unique histories, national interests, diplomatic styles, and areas of democratic interest and strength.

The major Asian democracies, for example, with their geographic proximity to China, have greater security concerns and a stronger need for alignment with the United States than most other middle-power democracies. In addition, they have handled the pandemic better than much of the world, giving them a new self-confidence to challenge the long-standing preeminence of Western democracies on international democracy support.

Yet it also operates well-funded democratic governance programs through its overseas development assistance and funds large, active party foundations that engage significantly on democracy issues worldwide.

Their actions to support global democracy involve each country individually determining its own direction. Alignment of such policies cannot be assumed; it must be consciously crafted. Middle-power democracies share many constraints on their international democracy engagement. Very few of them France and the United Kingdom are the two most important partial exceptions have enough hard power and diplomatic weight to single-handedly influence the course of events in other countries.

Most are aware that their actions alone will have little impact when it comes to diplomatic or economic sanctions against another state. So, while nearly all middle-power democracies have robust bilateral initiatives that can be quite agile and innovative, most tend to avoid direct confrontation, often believing or rationalizing that more aggressive approaches to fostering political change in other countries are counterproductive. Most of them also buttress their bilateral policies by putting significant effort into multilateral initiatives that can give them greater influence.

The need to smooth the edges of their individual policies in order to coordinate means their actions are often slower, more cautious, and more diffuse than the policies of a great power such as the United States. In addition, many middle-power democracies have faced various common difficulties in recent years that have hindered their ability to fill the obvious need for an increase in international democracy support.

Retaliatory pressure : Without the leadership and cover provided by the United States, middle- power democracies face greater risks in taking a hard stand on any international democracy issue that could lead to retaliation from China or Russia.

Acting collectively through the EU, European states might have the power to confront even the largest autocracies like China and Russia, but they have been reluctant to put at risk their commercial interests by giving greater priority to democracy support.

Middle-power democracies must also worry about being caught between the great powers. States such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea need Chinese trade for their economic security, while they are dependent on the U. They are particularly wary of taking steps that would challenge the United States or signal a break with it in any significant way. At the same time, they must watch their actions regarding China.

These realities, along with diplomatic and cultural factors, may have constrained them from acting on their own in the democracy sphere. Domestic needs : Internal political and economic turmoil has preoccupied many countries lately, particularly in Europe. The pandemic and the ensuing economic fallout have turned many countries inward, with political leaders feeling compelled to prioritize domestic over international needs.

Of course, the inward turn is not complete—the EU, for example, has put forward new ideas and plans for supporting democracy and rights globally even as it has been buffeted by the pandemic and other pressures. Mixed interests : Like all countries, middle-power democracies have numerous and often mutually contradictory security and economic priorities. Pro-democracy aspirations must often compete with the need to tackle climate change, maintain energy supplies or trade relations with non-democratic states, fight terrorism, cooperate with non-Western governments on migrants and refugees, and other interests.

As great-power competition has intensified, middle-power democracies find themselves grappling with sharper geopolitical dilemmas. These can narrow the scope for democracy support, even if they also bolster the view that middle-power democracies need to make support for democracy more central to their geopolitical strategies. Reflecting these constraints, middle-power democracies did not on the whole move forthrightly or concertedly to fill the gap left when the United States pulled back on democracy support after Trump became president.

To some degree, a paralyzing state of shock prevailed in many of their capitals when the White House began criticizing democratic allies, embracing authoritarians, and sending antidemocratic messages such as questioning the value of a free press. Sweden, for example, has undertaken a Drive for Democracy to magnify the already important place of democracy support in its foreign policy.

Different nations, states, and commonwealths have different duties for their citizens and different processes for naturalization. Use these classroom resources to help teach your students about the obligations and responsibilities that accompany citizenship. A government is a system of order for a nation, state, or another political unit.

A government is responsible for creating and enforcing the rules of a society, defense, foreign affairs, the economy, and public services. While the responsibilities of all governments are similar, those duties are executed in different ways depending on the form of government.

Some of the different types of government include a direct democracy, a representative democracy, socialism, communism, a monarchy, an oligarchy, and an autocracy. Help your students understand the different forms of government with these classroom resources.

Ancient Greek politics, philosophy, art and scientific achievements greatly influenced Western civilizations today.

One example of their legacy is the Olympic Games. Use the videos, media, reference materials, and other resources in this collection to teach about ancient Greece, its role in modern-day democracy, and civic engagement. Democracy in ancient Greece served as one of the first forms of self-rule government in the ancient world. The system and ideas employed by the ancient Greeks had profound influences on how democracy developed, and its impact on the formation of the U. A voter is a citizen who has the legal right to help make decisions for the nation.